Abstract Authenticated Key Exchange protocols enable several parties to establish a shared cryptographically strong key over an insecure network using various authentication means, such as strong cryptographic keys or short (i.e., low-entropy) common secrets. The latter example is definitely the most interesting in practice, since no additional device is required, but just a human-memorable password, for authenticating the players. After the seminal work by Bellovin and Merritt, many settings and security notions have been defined, and many protocols have been proposed, in the two-user setting and in the group setting.
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The functionality F PAKE is parameterized by a security parameter k. It interacts with an adversary S and a set of parties P1,. . . ,Pn via the following queries:
-Pi asks for a (NewSession, sid, Pi, Pj, pw ): Send (NewSession, sid, Pi, Pj) to S. If this is the first NewSession-query, or if this is the second NewSession-query and there is a record (Pj, Pi, pw ), then record (Pi, Pj, pw ) and mark this record fresh. -S asks for a (TestPwd, sid, Pi, pw ): If there is a record of the form (Pi, Pj, pw ) which is fresh, then do:
• If pw = pw , mark the record compromised and reply with "correct guess";
• If pw = pw , mark the record interrupted and reply with "wrong guess". -S asks for a (NewKey, sid, Pi, sk ): If there is a record of the form (Pi, Pj, pw ), and this is the first NewKey-query for Pi, then:
• If this record is compromised, or either Pi or Pj is corrupted, then output (sid, sk ) to player Pi;
• If this record is fresh, and there is a record (Pj, Pi, pw ) with pw = pw , and a key sk was sent to Pj, and (Pj, Pi, pw ) was fresh at the time, then output (sid, sk ) to Pi; • In any other case, pick a new random key sk of length k and send (sid, sk ) to Pi. Either way, mark the record (Pi, Pj, pw ) as completed. 
Simulation-based Security
The latter model [16] is in the simulation-based framework, with an ideal functionality in which the adversary is allowed to check one password per session. This models on-line dictionary attacks. Excepted this test instance password, no information is leaked about the passwords and the session keys.
Universal Composability
In both above models, one formalized the fact that, with an active attack, the adversary can basically test one password, whereas passive eavesdropping does not (computationally) leak any information. The goal is essentially to rule out off-line dictionary attacks in which the adversary makes some active and passive attacks, and then makes an off-line brute-force attack on the dictionary. On-line brute-force attacks, which are unavoidable, should be the only possible way to have some information about the session keys, and thus many interactions with a real player are required.
However, there were still some limitations on the password distributions and for composition with other protocols, which were overcome by Canetti, Halevi, Katz, Lindell and MacKenzie [24] . They indeed provided an ideal functionality in the Universally Composable (UC) security framework [23] , see Figure 1 . This functionality also models on-line dictionary attacks with a TestPwd-query that can be asked once to each user in sessions. An important property is that passwords are chosen by the environment which then hands them to the parties as inputs. This guarantees security even in the case where two honest players execute the protocol with two different passwords: the environment can emulate any distribution, mistypes of passwords and related passwords. Also note that allowing the environment to choose the passwords guarantees forward secrecy. This functionality mimics quite well some concrete requirements, but still, some leakage of information is not modeled, and could be exploited by a real-life adversary, whereas the ideal functionality does not allow it to the ideal-world adversary.
Explicit Authentication. With the above functionality, if neither party is corrupted, then they both end up with a uniformly-distributed session key, either the same key if the passwords are the same (success), or independent keys if the passwords are different (failure). Furthermore, the adversary learns nothing about the keys and the passwords, and even nothing about the status of the session (success or failure), but the users either. Explicit authentication, or mutual authentication modeled in [5] , provides the players with a session key if and only if the passwords are the same, informing the adversary of success or not. This is an interesting additional feature, which is also more relevant in practice. In the real life, the adversary anyway learns whether the protocol succeeded or not, since in the latter case the communication stops.
Combined with the split functionality [10] , it also allows to remove the TestPwd-query since the NewKeyquery would reveal to the adversary whether the passwords are the same or not, by leaking the success or failure status. The split functionality allows the adversary to split a session between users Alice and Bob into two sessions, one between Alice and the adversary trying to impersonate Bob, and a second one between Bob and the adversary trying to impersonate Alice. When the adversary plays with Alice, in case of success, this means it has guessed Alice's password, which is similar to the TestPwd-query.
Contributiveness. In the F PAKE functionality, if one party is corrupted, or if the adversary successfully guessed the player's password, the adversary is granted the right to fully determine the session key. Note that as soon as a party is corrupted, the adversary anyway learns the key, so one can think that nothing is lost by allowing it to fully determine it. But this is precisely the difference between key agreement and key distribution protocols.
In case of groups, this makes a huge difference. Hence the more recent functionality proposed by Abdalla, Catalano, Chevalier and Pointcheval [4] which provides the contributiveness property to Group Passwordbased Authenticated Key Exchange (GPAKE), see Figure 2 . PAKE is a particular case of GPAKE with groups of size 2. The latter property allows the adversary to fully determine the session key only if it has corrupted enough players, more than a threshold. This threshold can even be maximal: as soon as a player is honest, if a common key is generated, it is uniformly distributed in an unpredictable way. This means that no player has a more important role, and so there is no player to corrupt in priority for the adversary. As explained above, and as done in [5] , one can even remove TestPwd-queries, allowing the adversary to split the group into several subgroups, with sub-session-IDs, where the adversary plays the role of the other users.
The functionality F GPAKE is parameterized by a security parameter k, and the parameter t of the contributiveness. It interacts with an adversary S and a set of parties P1, . . . , Pn via the following queries:
-Pi asks for a (NewSession, sid, Pid, Pi, pw i ): If this is the first NewSession-query for Pi, where Pid is a set of at least two distinct identities containing Pi, record (sid, Pid, Pi, pw i ), mark it fresh, and send (sid, Pid, Pi) to S. Ignore any subsequent NewSession-queries with a different Pid set. If all the players involved in Pid have submitted their NewSession-queries, then record (sid, Pid, ready) and send it to S. -S asks for a (TestPwd, sid, Pid, Pi, pw ): If there exists a record of the form (sid, Pid, Pi, pw i ) which is fresh:
• If pw i = pw , mark the record compromised and reply with "correct guess";
• If pw i = pw , mark the record interrupted and reply with "wrong guess". -S asks for a (NewKey, sid, Pid, sk ): If there is a record of the form (sid, Pid, ready), then, denote by nc the number of corrupted players, and • If all Pi ∈ Pid have the same passwords and nc < t, choose sk ∈ {0, 1} k uniformly at random and store (sid, Pid, sk ).
• If all Pi ∈ Pid have the same passwords but nc ≥ t, store (sid, Pid, sk ). In both cases, for all Pi ∈ Pid, mark the record (sid, Pid, Pi, pw i ) completed. In any other case, store (sid, Pid, error), and for all Pi ∈ Pid, mark the record (sid, Pid, Pi, pw i ) error. When the key is set, report the result (either error or completed) to S. Bellovin and Merritt [15] proposed the first scheme, the so-called Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE), see Figure 3 for a sketch of the protocol, where E is assumed to be an encryption scheme onto the group G, sometimes modeled as an ideal cipher. A first security analysis has been provided in the indistinguishabilitybased framework, in the ideal-cipher model [12] , followed by several proofs of variations [8, 18, 19] , trying to reduce the need of ideal models but still keeping the initial efficiency of EKE. EKE has also been studied in the simulation-based framework, in the random-oracle model [16] , followed by studies in the UC framework [3] with security against adaptive corruptions, but still in ideal models. Our "simple PAKE" protocols [8] are definitely the most efficient, with a random oracle only for extracting the session key, with a security analysis in the Find-then-Guess scenario, under the CDH assumption.
Katz, Ostrovsky and Yung [33] proposed the first practical scheme, but still less efficient than above schemes, in the standard model with a common reference string, followed by a generalization from Gennaro and Lindell (GL) [28, 29] , using the power of smooth-projective hash functions [26] , in the Find-then-Guess scenario. Many variations [6, 24, 31, 34, 35] have thereafter been proposed, to get security in the UC framework, to improve round efficiency, or to rely on new assumptions.
Whereas the huge majority of the protocols rely on Diffie-Hellman assumptions, some efficient schemes have also been proposed on factoring-related assumptions [25, 30, 36, 37] . Besides the Secure Remote Password (SRP) protocol [39] and the Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) protocol [32] that have been standardized, EKE-like and GL-like schemes are the two main streams, with security analyses in the UC framework.
Group Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange
For groups, while the first proposals were extensions of the group Diffie-Hellman key exchange [17, 20, 38] , the Burmester and Desmedt construction [21, 22] became more appropriate, because of its constant number of rounds, independently of the size of the group. Several group password-based authenticated key exchange protocols have then been proposed [1, 2, 5, 9] , essentially combining a two-party PAKE with the Burmester and Desmedt methodology.
